What Is Chinese Investment In Dubai Consists Of? (TOP 5 Tips)

What is Dubai Investments Park?

• Dubai Investments Park is a unique, self-contained mixed-use industrial, commercial and residential zone operated by Dubai Investments Park Development Company LLC. Spread across an area of 2300 hectares (with 1,700 hectares leased), it is a city within a city offering world-class infrastructure and outstanding facilities and services.

Is Dubai a part of China?

Yes, Dubai is in Asia, but it’s also a part of the Middle East which could also be considered part of Africa. Dubai is not a country, it is a city and emirate in a country called the United Arab Emirates, this country is in the Middle East and this is a transcontinental region, ie. it lies in both Asia and Africa.

What is the best investment in Dubai?

7 Best Ways to Invest Your Money in Dubai

1. Real Estate. Considered by many as the epitome of prolific lifestyle, Dubai offers best in class homes, hotels, offices and a lot more.
2. Stocks. Investing in stocks is an obvious option when considering capital investment.
3. National Bonds.
4. Mutual Funds.
5. Gold.
6. Cryptocurrency.
7. Forex.

Why are there so many Chinese in Dubai?

Many Chinese expatriates hail from the Wenzhou region; they are mostly businessmen and merchants who run hundreds of commodity shops through the Emirates. Chinese culture in the Emirates has a sizeable presence; there are many Chinese restaurants in Dubai.

Is UAE an ally of China?

The UAE and China have been strong international allies, with significant cooperation across economic, political and cultural aspects.

Can a foreigner buy a house in Dubai?

Buying property in Dubai In Dubai, foreign ownership is permitted in areas designated as freehold. Foreigners (who don’t live in the UAE) and expatriate residents may acquire freehold ownership rights over property without restriction, usufruct rights, or leasehold rights for up to 99 years.

Where can I invest a small amount of money in Dubai?

7 Best Short term Investment Plans in UAE

1. Savings Account. Being one of the top choices of the majority of the people, savings account provides high liquidity.
2. Liquid Funds.
3. Fixed Deposits.
4. Recurring Deposits.
5. Equity Derivatives.
6. Gold & Silver Investments.
7. Fixed Maturity Plans (FMPs)

What is the Indian population in UAE?

Indian expatriate community of approx. 3.5 millions (as per International Migrant Stock 2020 released by the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) is reportedly the largest ethnic community in UAE constituting roughly about 30 per cent of the country’s population.

Diversified Investment in UAE Shaping China’s Economic Role in the Gulf

Citizens of the United Arab Emirates who wish to go to India for leisure can apply for an e-visa through the Indian Embassy in their home country. Obtaining an e-visa is required prior to arriving in the country.

Emirate-Level Linkages

Citizens of the United Arab Emirates who wish to go to India for leisure can apply for an e-visa online. Obtaining an e-visa must be done prior to entering the country.

Overlapping Interests

Complimentarities in free zone development, technical innovation, logistics and infrastructure skills, and other areas of mutual interest further promote economic alignment between the United Arab Emirates and China. The development trajectory of the UAE’s large free zone sector, which comprises of more than 40 free zones, bears many parallels to the development trajectory of China’s special economic zones in the country’s coastal areas, according to the World Bank. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, both nations established economic zones in order to achieve a restricted type of liberalization in the economic sector.

1. Beginning operations in the Khalifa Port Free Trade Zone in 2018, the Jiangsu Provincial Overseas Cooperation and Investment Company Limited, with an estimated $1 billion in investments, became the first Chinese company to do so.
2. There are approximately 10,000 Chinese companies in the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre free zone, which hosts approximately 10% of all Chinese companies in the United Arab Emirates.
3. A greater level of collaboration between the two nations is possible because to the growth of e-commerce.
4. To test autonomous vehicle deliveries in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, the e-commerce business Noon.com, which has its headquarters in Dubai, teamed up with the Chinese technology company Neolix to form a partnership with the company Neolix.
5. The development of the UAE’s embryonic e-commerce platforms will have an impact on how this growth develops throughout the Gulf.
6. In contrast to the rest of the Gulf, where a state-led emphasis on fostering indigenous technology industries is evident, the UAE has invested significant political capital in this area.
7. In spite of this, most private-sector companies have not chosen to transfer their research and development divisions to the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
8. Chinese universities have a dominant role in the worldwide creation of inventions in the fields of distributed artificial intelligence, machine learning methods, neuroscience/neurorobotics, and other related fields.
9. It is necessary to develop local partnerships with enterprises that have shown port management and logistics competence in order to carry out hard and soft infrastructure projects as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Particularly attractive to provincial investment groups seeking to develop an integrated network of Asian, Middle Eastern, and African markets as part of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative is the embeddedness of Emirati firms – as well as a military presence – in the Horn of Africa, which includes Ethiopia and Somalia.

Policymakers in the United Arab Emirates are hoping that a rising tide of Chinese economic activity would raise all boats in the country.

As a result of global trade disputes, as well as the presence of other Gulf Arab governments with similar objectives in luring Chinese trade and investment, the UAE may find it difficult to maintain control over the depth and direction of this relationship in the future years.

The Latest

The 11th of February in the year 2022 The following report is based on the presentations and discussions that took place during the UAE Security Forum 2021, “U.S.-Gulf Relationships in a Changing Region,” which took place virtually on December 7-9, 2021.

Iraq and Kuwait Close the File on Reparations, Look to Open a New Chapter

Douglas A. Silliman is the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. 10th of February, 2022 However, despite the fact that Iraq’s final reparations payment to Kuwait may open the way to deeper collaboration, conflicting visions and common security concerns will determine the future.

Qatari Emir’s Visit Points to Deepening Cooperation With Washington, Despite Differences

Douglas A. Silliman is the United States ambassador to the United Nations. 10.02.2022, 10th of February Increased collaboration may be possible as a result of Iraq’s final reparations payment to Kuwait, but the future will be shaped by conflicting visions and common security concerns.

Support Us

In addition, through its careful examination of the forces influencing the evolution of Gulf societies and the new generation of emerging leaders, the AGSIW contributes to a more complete understanding of the role that countries in this critical geostrategic region can be expected to play in the twenty-first century. Read on to find out more

The UAE signed a massive, $3.4 billion deal with China — and that ‘isn’t a surprise’

On April 26, 2019, in Beijing, Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates and ruler of the Emirate of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, China’s President Xi Jinping, and his wife Peng Liyuan (L-R) arrive at the National Museum of China for a reception marking the Belt and Road Forum, which is being hosted by the Chinese government. TASS | Getty Images | Valery Sharifulin | TASS According to World Economic Forum President Brge Brende, a decision by China and the United Arab Emirates to strengthen trade and investment ties through new arrangements totaling $3.4 billion “isn’t a surprise.” China and the United Arab Emirates have signed new trade and investment agreements worth $3.4 billion.

“A number of nations, such as the United Arab Emirates, perceive enormous market prospects in China.” During the weekend, the United Arab Emirates and China signed new agreements worth a combined $3.4 billion as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a massive infrastructure project that involves the construction of highways, railways, and shipping lines between China and more than 60 countries in Asia and Europe as well as the Middle East and North Africa.

The latest deal is anticipated to increase bilateral commerce from its current value of $53 billion to $70 billion by the end of next year.

China has already surpassed the United Arab Emirates as the country’s second largest economic partner, and the UAE acts as a significant gateway for Chinese exports to the region.

Compared to 10 years ago, we’re living in an entirely different world than we were. It is a multipolar, multi-conceptual universe in which we live.

Expanding influence

The United Arab Emirates has emerged as a crucial player in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road program, which is seeking to link China’s markets in Asia and Europe through a variety of critical, and at times contentious, investments in infrastructure. Some have speculated that China is exploiting the project to increase its economic and geopolitical power, but Beijing has always denied these allegations, saying they are based on faulty information. “Compared to ten years ago, we’re living in an entirely different world than we were.

“Multipolar, in the sense that we are witnessing a significant increase in geopolitical rivalry.

It is not simply one that we are accustomed to, given the way things are managed in the United States and Western Europe “He went on to say more.

UAE will be ‘vital’

According to Sheikh Mohammed’s tweet on Friday, when he unveiled plans for a $1 billion “Vegetable Basket” project that would import, process, pack, and export agricultural, marine, and animal goods along the new Silk Road, the UAE will be “a crucial station along the new Silk Road.” He went on to say that the initiative is being backed by the China-Arab Investment Fund. “Given the Arab world’s strategic location that connects East and West, the Arab-Chinese relationship will favorably contribute to the Belt and Road Initiative,” Sheikh Mohammed said in a tweet.

The project is supported by the China-Arab Investment Fund.

As part of its partnership with the World Economic Forum, the UAE government has also established “The Centre for Fourth Industrial Revolution” in the Emirates, which will be the first of its type in the region and the fifth in the world.

that is blurring the borders between the physical, digital, and biological worlds” is defined as a “technological revolution.

Following a government announcement, officials explained that the new initiative, which was developed through a collaboration between Dubai Future Foundation and the World Economic Forum, aims to develop mechanisms, applications, and uses for the fourth industrial revolution in the United Arab Emirates.

“Those countries that are at the forefront of these new technologies, which include artificial intelligence, the internet of things, big data, and autonomous cars, will emerge as the most wealthy nations at the end of this century.” “It comes as no surprise that the United Arab Emirates and Dubai are in the lead,” he continued.

Chinese real estate investors flock to Dubai

According to Sheikh Mohammed’s tweet on Friday, when he unveiled plans for a $1 billion “Vegetable Basket” project that would import, process, package, and export agricultural, marine, and animal goods along the new Silk Road, the UAE will be “a crucial station along the new Silk Road.” In addition, the China-Arab Investment Fund is providing funding for the project, he said. “Given the Arab world’s strategic location that connects East and West, the Arab-Chinese relationship will positively contribute to the Belt and Road Initiative,” Sheikh Mohammed wrote in a tweet.

1. During the construction of the new Silk Road, the United Arab Emirates will serve as a critical stopover.
2. Specifically, a “technological revolution.
3. He did so in 1999.
4. He believes that the Fourth Industrial Revolution will have a profound impact on the whole twenty-first century.
5. The fact that the UAE and Dubai are in the forefront of this is not surprising, he continued.

Investment strengthens ties between China and the GCC

In the midst of economic diversification initiatives being implemented across the area, GCC governments are attempting to both strengthen trade links with countries across the world and attract foreign investment into the region. China, which is pushing forward with its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, has shown to be a willing partner for regional governments (BRI). Chinese President Xi Jinping presented a strategy for the expansion of Sino-Arab cooperation in 2014, which was dubbed the 1+2+3 framework.

China’s long-term objectives, which take advantage of the Arab countries’ geostrategic location between Europe, Africa, and the Far East, are in line with those of the GCC governments, which are likewise able to support increasing demand for their oil.

Despite the fact that the recent slowdown in China’s economy may be a source of some concern for Gulf countries, the escalation of economic transactions and political interaction between the parties reflect the expanding interdependence between China and the rest of the world.

OilGas

As shown by the 1+2+3 strategy, China’s principal interest in the GCC continues to be its massive energy reserves, with the bloc accounting for around 27 percent of China’s total oil imports in 2017 (according to the International Energy Agency). With China overtaking the United States as the world’s top oil importer in 2017, the country’s consumption, along with that of India, has been driving the increase in demand. Growing energy commerce between the GCC and China, as well as Chinese investment in the GCC’s energy infrastructure, are projected to grow increasingly prominent.

Saudi Aramco is the national oil corporation of Saudi Arabia.

It is the second joint venture between the partners, after the 2009 debut of a 240,000-barrel-per-day (bpd) refinery in China, which Saudi Aramco provides with crude.

In the United Arab Emirates, a flurry of deals between the country’s main oil business, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), and the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation were signed in 2017 and 2018.

Infrastructure

Apart from China’s vested interests in the region’s energy resources, another major development has been the increase in Chinese investment in infrastructure mega-projects throughout the GCC. Following the rising consumer markets in the Gulf, as well as the region’s investment-friendly climate and geostrategic position, Chinese companies have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in such projects. The Chinese investment can serve as a stimulant for diversification in their host countries at a time when government expenditures are being re-evaluated, as well as a benefit for the local construction industry.

In May 2016, a consortium of six Chinese companies known as Wanfang Oman signed a memorandum of understanding with the Duqm Special Economic Zone Authority to establish an industrial park within the zone.

Wanfang began construction on the park in April of this year. A significant contribution to Oman’s construction industry growth rate, which has more than quadrupled between 2016 and 2019, will come from Chinese investment in the development project.

TradeFinance

Efforts to reduce barriers to investment and trade are taking place in tandem with this expansion of economic partnerships. Throughout recent years, Chinese financial institutions have expanded their operations in the area, simplifying the exchange of currencies and expanding the availability of yuan financing. The United Arab Emirates has been at the forefront of this movement. During the crown prince of Abu Dhabi’s visit to China in December 2015, the two nations inked an agreement to construct a yuan clearing center in the UAE, allowing UAE borrowers to access yuan-denominated loans.

A three-year CNY35bn ($5.2bn) agreement between the People’s Bank of China, the nation’s central bank, and the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates was renewed during the same visit.

With the expanding use of the yuan in the Middle East and North Africa, such transactions might help the UAE establish itself as a regional hub for yuan financial flows.

For example, during President Xi’s visit to Dubai in July 2018, the Chinese Everbright Group (CEG), a state-owned corporation, signed an agreement with the Dubai International Finance Centre (DIFC) to work on BRI possibilities in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (MEASA).

In particular, he said that “Dubai has proven to be the most advantageous position from which we can tap into the potential of fast-growing emerging markets in the MEASA area.” Recent years have also seen the establishment of offices in the DIFC by four Chinese banks as well as other prominent Chinese corporations.

Tech Cooperation

GCC countries’ long-term plans place a strong emphasis on the development of domestic technical and scientific skills as part of their efforts to transition to knowledge-based economies. By investing early in these sectors, China hopes to plant the seeds of future collaborations in these fields. The latter is especially true in the field of unconventional energy, in which China is a world leader. In 2017 and 2018, Chinese authorities signed nuclear energy cooperation agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, respectively.

In terms of renewables, China and the United Arab Emirates identified green energy as one of ten priority areas in their strategic relationship, which was unveiled in July 2018.

The project is the world’s largest concentrated solar project.

The Rise of Chinese Investment in Dubai

GCC countries’ long-term plans place a high value on the development of domestic technical and scientific skills as part of their efforts to transition to knowledge-based economies. By investing early in these disciplines, China hopes to plant the seeds of possible collaborations in the future. The latter is especially true in the field of unconventional energy, in which China is a world leader. Nuclear energy cooperation agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia were inked by Chinese officials in 2017 and 2018.

For example, in a strategic collaboration established in July 2018, China and the United Arab Emirates identified green energy as one of ten priority areas.

The project is the world’s largest concentrated solar project and is expected to be completed by 2018.

Influence Without Entanglement in the Middle East

The United States has been attempting to detach itself from the Middle East for the past 12 years. As a result, regional powers such as Iran, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have reacted by seeking new partners and intensifying their competition with one another. Outside of the headlines, however, China has emerged as the most significant victor in the post-American Middle East. Beijing has already surpassed Saudi Arabia as the region’s top consumer of oil. Now, almost without fanfare, it has risen to the position of being the sole foreign force having significant political and trade links to every major country in the region.

1. China’s expanding influence in the Middle East does not yet pose a direct threat to any of the United States’ most important objectives.
2. forces, relationships, and economic access in the region.
3. It should also acknowledge that the vast majority of its Middle Eastern friends and partners—including Israel and the Gulf states—are adamant about not taking sides in a geopolitical conflict between the United States and China.
4. Wang Jisi, China’s most influential foreign-policy critic, introduced an idea he dubbed “marching westward” in 2012, which has since gained popularity.
5. Wang stated that the eventual exit of the United States from the Middle East may even be a “win-win” situation since the United States was “desperate” for China’s aid in stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan.
6. As a result, regional powers such as Iran, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have reacted by seeking new partners and intensifying their competition with one another.
7. Beijing has already surpassed Saudi Arabia as the region’s top consumer of oil.
8. This indicates that the Middle East is reemerging as a theater of great-power struggle, which is good news for the United States.
9. China’s expanding alignment with Iran and cordial ties to anti-American Shiite militia organizations, on the other hand, are troubling and pose long-term hazards to U.S.
10. The Biden administration should impose penalties on China and Iran in order to prevent their emerging strategic cooperation from becoming uncontrollably large and powerful.
11. Soon after the Obama administration declared its “pivot to Asia” in 2011, China began looking for a new strategic idea for its involvement with the Middle East.

According to him, “the relationship between the United States and China has grown increasingly confrontational and zero-sum as Washington rebalances to Asia.” In addition, Wang projected that as rivalry in maritime Asia heated up, Central Asia and the Middle East would become more receptive to interaction with China as a result.

It was published just before the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Party Congress, when Xi Jinping was to be elevated to the top job, and it foreshadowed the strategic logic, slogans, and financing concepts that would soon be institutionalized in the form of One Belt, One Road, later known as the Belt and Road Initiative.

Wang’s specific focus on the Middle East, on the other hand, drew sharp and quick responses.

Following a few lines of personal appreciation for Wang, Xian went into a scathing attack of the Chinese leader.

“From the standpoint of distance, the western surrounding nations come first, followed by the Middle East countries that are somewhat far away, and finally the faraway African countries.” In his subsequent argument, Xian said that Wang was urging China to overextend itself in strategic sinkholes, much as the United States had done in Afghanistan and Iraq, implying that Wang was encouraging China to do so.

Another criticism of Wang’s idea was that “marching westward” would cause the other major countries to become embittered.

The Chinese government should refrain from “taking a huge step in, but rather assess the strategic dangers and develop a strategic strategy to properly comprehend its ‘westward advance.'” For the most part, many Chinese foreign-policy thinkers were extremely concerned about the possibility that a high-profile Chinese project such to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may backfire in the Middle East.

• However, Chinese strategists were wary of being entangled in the region’s complex web of national and sectarian strife, despite the logic of using the country’s economic strength for political gain.
• Over the years, the Middle East has served as a sinkhole for numerous foreign empires, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and France, among others.
• China frequently promotes its deal-making in Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and South America with a lot of media attention and red-carpet picture opportunities.
• For example, there has been nothing published about the Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund’s investment in SenseTime, a Chinese artificial intelligence startup best known for its face recognition software, which has received little attention.
• The $400 billion comprehensive strategic relationship between China and Iran is only known to the general public because it was leaked.
• In addition to Egypt, Iran, Iraq, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, the list of nations that have backed the BRI and pledged to collaborate in some capacity with it includes Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.
• These countries are nearly completely at odds with one another—except that they all seek closer relations with China.

In Iran’s domestic politics, a somewhat pro-China reformist movement and an ultra-pro-China hard-liner party, both of which have warmly welcomed the BRI, are competing for influence.

Relations between China and Iran have been amicable for decades, but they have accelerated significantly under Donald Trump’s administration.

Two weeks ago, it was expected that the two countries will undertake combined naval maneuvers in the Indian Ocean.

Chinese Shiite groups are drawn to the country for similar reasons: they see it as a strategic counterweight to the United States, which they consider a threat.

Contrary to expectations, this has not resulted in an anti-China backlash in the region’s key Sunni governments.

In defiance of U.S.

The United Arab Emirates was the first jurisdiction outside of the United States to obtain emergency permission for Sinopharm’s COVID-19 vaccine.

Surprisingly, China has only suffered a little diplomatic backlash in the Middle East as a result of its egregious human rights violations against its own Muslim minorities.

Two major business agreements were inked between the two nations, and the rising leader commended China’s domestic “anti-terrorism” tactics, which was seen as a veiled support of the crackdown on the Uyghurs.

Nonetheless, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been deafeningly silent on the subject in recent months, and Turkish police have purportedly detained hundreds of Uyghur migrants at the demand of China.

Even Israel is defying U.S.

A Chinese state-owned firm holds a 25-year operating lease on the Israeli port of Haifa, which is controlled by the Chinese government.

Aside from that, China is also investing hundreds of millions of dollars every year in Israel’s technology sector, despite the Trump administration’s months-long charm drive to persuade Israel to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

Essentially, this describes a general characteristic of the region, which is as follows: Rather than having less national interests in the Middle East now than it had a decade or two ago, the United States has fewer of them.

One of the most significant is Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

As long as China’s burgeoning investment engagement with Iran provides the regime with power in these discussions, or as long as China’s purchases of Iranian oil allow time for the regime to go on a nuclear enrichment sprint, the United States must resist.

China’s establishment of an authoritarian geopolitical bloc, as well as its development as a supplier of techno-authoritarian instruments, are both vitally crucial interests for the United States.

Finally, the United States has a vital interest in stopping China from supporting Hezbollah and hostile Shiite forces in Iraq, which pose a threat to American partners and interests in the region.

When dealing with geopolitically sensitive situations such as Lebanon’s, the United States may need to rely on the International Monetary Fund to loosen the purse strings.

The current state of affairs in the Middle East is largely favorable to China.

In order to maintain this system, China seeks to have the power to exert pressure on individual nations to bow to its will over the course of time.

interests in this area, China’s ability to quietly acquire willing partners in the Middle East is remarkable and merits further investigation. If Beijing is going to be the primary beneficiary of the regional security order, the United States should not be satisfied with simply underwriting it.

Gulf Tiger

United States has attempted to withdraw from the Middle East for more than a decade. As a result, regional powers such as Iran, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have sought new allies while intensifying their competition with one another. Outside of the headlines, however, China has emerged as the most significant beneficiary of the post-U.S. Middle East transition period. Previously, Beijing was the region’s largest buyer of oil. The United States has quietly established itself as the only outside power with strong political and trading ties to every major country in the region.

1. Washington sees it as evidence that the Middle East is once again becoming an arena for interstate rivalry among superpowers.
2. Chinese alignment with Iran and friendly ties to anti-American Shiite militia groups, however, are cause for concern, as they pose long-term threats to U.S.
3. The Biden administration should impose costs on China and Iran in order to prevent their budding strategic partnership from becoming uncontrollably powerful and dangerous.
4. As soon as the Obama administration announced its “pivot to Asia” in 2011, China began looking for a new strategic concept for its engagement with the Middle East.
5. According to him, “as Washington rebalances to Asia,” the relationship between the United States and China has become increasingly contentious and zero-sum in nature.
6. Since the United States was “desperate” for China’s assistance in stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan, Wang argued that the inevitable U.S.
7. United States has attempted to withdraw from the Middle East for more than a decade.

Outside of the headlines, however, China has emerged as the most significant beneficiary of the post-U.S.

Previously, Beijing was the region’s largest buyer of oil.

This has occurred without fanfare.

China’s increasing influence in the Middle East does not yet pose a direct threat to any of the United States’ most important national interests in the region.

forces, partnerships, and commercial access.

Additionally, it should be aware that the vast majority of its Middle Eastern allies and partners—including Israel and the Gulf states—are adamant about not taking sides in a geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China.

According to Wang Jisi, one of China’s most prominent foreign-policy commentators, the country should be “marching westward” by the end of the year 2012.

Amid the intensifying competition in maritime Asia, Wang foresees that Central Asia and the Middle East will become more open to Chinese engagement.

withdrawal from the Middle East could even be a “win-win,” as he put it.

Wang’s essay foreshadowed the strategic logic, campaign slogans, and financing concepts that would be institutionalized in the form of One Belt, One Road, or the Belt and Road Initiative, later known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

According to a response essay by scholar Xian Xiao, the Chinese government should prioritize its neighbors first and avoid distributing its resources too widely.

His curiosity piqued, “What does the term ‘West’ refer to?” “From the standpoint of distance, the western neighboring countries come first, followed by the Middle East countries that are moderately distant, and then the distant African countries.” As a result of Wang’s words, Xian argued that China was being encouraged to overextend itself in strategic sinkholes—much as the United States, by implication, had done in Afghanistan and Iraq.

1. Another criticism of Wang’s proposal asserted that “marching westward” would cause the other great powers to become emboldened.
2. For the most part, many Chinese foreign-policy intellectuals were deeply concerned about the possibility that a high-profile Chinese project akin to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would backfire in the Middle East.
3. It is true that history indicates that averting such a situation is a difficult task.
4. It is because of these considerations that China has approached the Belt and Road Initiative in the Middle East differently than it has in any other part of the world.
5. When it comes to dealing with countries in the Middle East, however, Beijing makes every effort to keep its transactions out of the media.
6. China’s Belt and Road Initiative agreements with Middle Eastern countries have never been made public in their entirety, whether in English, Chinese or the local language.
7. It is clear that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is meeting China’s goal of gaining influence in the Middle East without becoming involved in it.

The fact that this has occurred should serve as a wake-up call to the people of the United States.

The strategic cooperation between China and Iran is the one that poses the greatest threat to U.S.

In Iran’s domestic politics, a somewhat pro-China reformist movement and an ultra-pro-China hard-liner party, both of which have warmly welcomed the BRI, are competing for power.

For decades, ties between China and Iran have been cordial, but they have accelerated significantly during Donald Trump’s administration.

Two weeks ago, it was planned that the two countries will undertake combined naval drills in the Indian Ocean.

If the money does indeed arrive on the predicted timeline, Tehran will be compelled to drive a harsher bargain in its nuclear discussions with the Biden administration if it believes it would get Chinese support.

When it comes to long-term strategic partners, Iraq’s electrical minister stated in October 2019 that “China is our top choice as a strategic partner.” As a rebuttal to the United States, Shiite paramilitary organizations from Iraq and Syria (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) to Lebanon (Hezbollah) have consistently lauded China and requested Chinese funding.

1. China will be taught as a third language in all Saudi Arabian schools and colleges, according to a new initiative.
2. pressure, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have all contracted with Chinese telecom equipment manufacturer Huawei to develop their 5G telecommunications infrastructure.
3. In a snapshot sent on Twitter, Dubai ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum appears to be receiving the injection.
4. During a visit to Beijing in 2019, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received high acclaim.
5. A few years ago, Turkey was a notable protector of the Uyghurs, a Turkic people that have a significant presence in Istanbul and who are considered to be a Turkic people by many.
6. Despite the fact that Turkey’s economy is slipping further into recession, Erdogan is reliant on Chinese investment and trade more than ever.
7. demands to curtail its trade relations with China.

A request from the United States to see the facility was turned down by the Israeli government earlier this month.

Presently, China’s expanding influence in the Middle East does not pose a direct danger to any significant American interests, despite its rapid expansion.

China’s efforts, on the other hand, have an indirect impact on a variety of interests in ways that are worth evaluating and reacting to.

A new, enforceable nuclear agreement with Iran or a return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is critical for the national security of the United States and the survival of American allies.

The interdiction of vessels carrying illegal cargoes and the imposition of secondary sanctions are examples of such measures.

Washington has few effective means of halting the growing detente between Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran, but it can surely impose penalties on nations that acquire armaments or surveillance capabilities from China, as it did with Turkey when it purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems.

Hezbollah did not receive the avalanche of investment in Lebanon that China promised last summer, but Washington must keep communicating to Beijing that it will pay a price if it continues to support the terrorist organization.

When it comes to gaining influence in the area while staying out of the region’s complicated national rivalries and sectarian disputes, Beijing is well aware that it is treading on thin ice.

United States pays vast sums to battle extremist organizations and defend freedom of passage in the region, while China benefits in the form of stable oil prices as a result of this expenditure.

There is no imminent threat to American interests in this situation; but, China’s ability to quietly find willing allies in the Middle East is remarkable and merits more investigation.

In the long run, the United States should not be satisfied with just underwriting the regional security order if Beijing would be the principal benefactor.

Key Takeaways

• It is known as the Gulf Tiger in reference to the Middle Eastern city of Dubai, which is located in the United Arab Emirates. Dubai is one of the most significant hubs of trade and tourism in the Middle East, and the moniker refers to this fact. Located in the United Arab Emirates, Dubai is a financial, information technology, and real estate centre. The city is committed to reducing its reliance on oil by investing in renewable energy sources.

Understanding the Gulf Tiger

The Gulf Tiger is known for having one of the fastest-growing economies in the Middle East, earning the moniker “the Gulf Tiger.” Dubai, which is located on the Arabian Peninsula south of the Persian Gulf and one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the area, is one of the most important financial centers in the world. It is the most populous and has the second-largest land area among the seven emirates in the United Arab Emirates. As one of the most popular tourist destinations in the Middle East, it also has the busiest international airport in the area, Hamad International Airport.

1. This is one of the reasons why it is referred to as an Asian Gulf Tiger in addition to other terms.
2. While oil exports were the primary foundation of Dubai’s economy, the city has since expanded into other sectors such as real estate, construction, trade, and financial services.
3. Due to significant investment in the city’s infrastructure, Dubai has been converted into a financial, information technology, and real estate powerhouse.
4. Other important areas include banking, commerce, tourism, transportation, and aviation.

• Buildings such as the Burj Khalifa, the world’s tallest structure
• The Palm Islands, a group of three manmade islands off the coast of Dubai
• Jebel Ali Port, the world’s largest man-made harbor as well as the largest port in the Middle East
• And the Dubai Fountain.

Foreign investors flock to the United Arab Emirates because of the country’s good economic climate, political stability, and the fact that the government does not directly tax firms.

Special Considerations

The city is dedicated to reducing its reliance on oil as a source of revenue. The development of renewable energy sources is a major driver of the city’s continuous expansion. Dubai’s leaders said in January 2017 that the government intends to considerably expand its reliance on renewable energy in the future, with a goal of producing 44 percent of the city’s energy from renewable sources by 2050. A total of $163 billion will be invested in this project, which will involve the development of Dubai’s infrastructure.

Challenges

The Gulf Tiger was particularly severely impacted by the financial crisis of 2007-2008, in part because of its reliance on tourism and construction industries. As a result of the slowdown in international travel, which had a significant impact on the retail sector, numerous large building projects were put on hold or halted. Also in 2009, construction on the Dubai shoreline, which was supposed to be the world’s largest waterfront, came to an abrupt halt. The value of real estate has likewise declined.

The global COVID-19 epidemic had a negative impact on the economy of Dubai, as it did on the economies of other countries.

As stated by Reuters, the economy would most likely not recover to its prior levels until about 2023. The local economy is predicted to rebound in 2022-23, in part as a result of Expo, a big worldwide conference that will take place between October 2021 and March 2022 in the city.

China: Red Moon Rising

Because of its emphasis on tourism and construction, the Gulf Tiger was particularly badly impacted during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The decline in international tourism had a significant impact on the retail industry, and numerous large development projects were put on hold. Also in 2009, construction on the Dubai shoreline, which was supposed to be the world’s largest waterfront, came to a halt. As a result, the value of real estate has fallen as well. At least until 2011, several areas of the city did not witness any change.

Once again, the retail, tourist, and transportation sectors have been struck the hardest, with real GDP shrinking by 10.8 percent in 2020 as a result of the global economic downturn.

The local economy is predicted to rebound in 2022-23, in part as a result of Expo, a big global convention that will take place between October 2021 and March 2022 in the region.

Key Points

• The Gulf Tiger was particularly severely impacted by the financial crisis of 2007-2008, in part because of its reliance on tourism and construction. Foreign tourism decreased, which had a significant impact on the retail sector, and numerous large development projects came to a standstill. Also in 2009, construction on the Dubai shoreline, which is expected to be the world’s largest waterfront, came to an abrupt halt. The value of real estate has also decreased. Some areas of the city did not experience significant improvements until at least 2011. Like other regions of the world, Dubai’s economy was affected by the worldwide COVID-19 outbreak, which occurred in late 2018. Once again, the retail, tourist, and transportation sectors have been struck the hardest, with real GDP shrinking by 10.8 percent in 2020 as a result of the economic downturn. According to Reuters, the economy would most likely not return to its prior levels until about 2023. Expo, a big worldwide conference that will take place between October 2021 and March 2022, is intended to help the local economy rebound in 2022-23.

• For the foreseeable future, we expect our less-than-favorable assessment on Chinese stocks to stay intact in terms of portfolio positioning. However, as a result of the current sell-off and significant worsening in mood, our outlook has somewhat improved.

The Tortoise vs. the Hare in the Year of the Ox

Since 2020, we have seen as the traditional drama of speed against perseverance has played out in the global equities markets. With good control over the COVID-19 outbreak, rapid accommodation of monetary and fiscal policy, and durable export growth early in the pandemic, China emerged as a hare and outperformed other global equities markets through 2020. At first glance, China appeared to be destined to be the “winner” of this cycle—but not so fast. The slow and steady strategy of other global equity markets, which began with a similar pacing as the tortoise, has been paying off since the March 2020 bottom, with just two drawdowns of less than 7 percent since then.

4

China’s “Firsts”

Several worldwide “Firsts” enabled China to outperform other countries in the early stages of the epidemic. These included:

• China was the first country to experience the COVID-19 crisis, with the initial outbreak originating in Wuhan and spreading throughout the world
• China was one of the first countries to implement (and then emerge from) COVID-19 lockdowns, conduct contact tracing, and require public adherence to mask-wearing
• China was one of the first countries to implement (and then emerge from) COVID-19 contact tracing
• China was one of the first countries to require public adherence to mask-wearing
• China was China was the most significant benefactor of expanding global goods demand, with its export sector soaring in response to increased demand for supplies such as medical equipment and housing-related commodities, among other things.

COVID-19 began in Wuhan, China, and spread throughout the world; China was one of the first countries to implement (and then exit) COVID-19 lockdowns, conduct contact tracing, and require public compliance with mask-wearing regulations; China was one of the first countries in the world to implement (and then exit) COVID-19 contact tracing; China was one of the first countries in the world to implement (and then exit) COVID-19 lockdowns; China was one of the first In response to increased demand for supplies such as medical equipment and housing-related commodities, China’s export industry saw a boom, making it the most significant benefactor of expanding global goods demand.

China’s Regulatory Recapture

The first shoe to drop in 2021 was the tightening of monetary policy, but it was not the last. With each passing month, a cascade of regulatory shocks suffocated the market as Chinese authorities shifted their focus toward the achievement of “common prosperity for everyone.” Regulators began focusing their attention on large digital platform businesses, and more lately, they have shifted their attention to the private education sector, since the expense of private tuition has become a financial burden for the majority of parents.

Brief Overview of China’s Tech Giants7

• The first shoe to drop in 2021 was a tightening of monetary policy, but it was not the last one to drop. An onslaught of regulatory shocks crippled markets throughout the year as Chinese authorities shifted their focus toward the achievement of “common prosperity for everyone.” When it comes to regulation, the focus has shifted from large digital platform businesses to the private education industry, which has become a hardship for most parents due to the high expense of private tuition. Brief Overview of China’s Technology Giants7.

Many of these regulatory efforts are unlikely to be terminated very soon since they are intended to contribute to the long-term strategic goal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since 1953, the Communist Party of China (CCP) has been putting up five-year socioeconomic plans, and it is now working on its fourteenth five-year plan, which will cover the years 2021-2025. From antitrust to data infringement to green development, the most recent 50 regulatory actions are equivalent to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) measures in Western economies.

We do not believe that China would considerably scale down its attempts to enhance productivity, particularly given the fact that demographic headwinds are expected to worsen in the coming decade.

COVID’s Comeback

Along with coping with a new regulatory reset, China is also grappling with a COVID-19 revival as the Delta strain of the virus has spread across the nation. When COVID-19 initially emerged, China’s response was commendable, as stringent lockdowns and contact tracing activities enabled the country to reduce the number of patients and ultimately emerge as the first country to begin reestablishing its economy after the outbreak. Because the Delta variety is anticipated to be more than twice as infectious as earlier strains,8 it will be extremely challenging for lockdowns to prevent transmission.

9This contrasts to 50 percent and 60 percent (completely vaccinated) in the United States and the Eurozone, respectively, for the same populations.

The effectiveness of their two most frequent vaccinations, Sinovac and Sinopharm, has also been called into doubt, with some research suggesting that they are less protective than Western vaccine competitors, such as Pfizer and Moderna, which have been developed in the West.

12If this policy reaction is maintained over an extended period of time, it is likely to have a significant impact on economic development, in contrast to many other countries that have refrained from such lockdown measures.

Multi-Asset Perspective

Many headwinds exist in China’s macroeconomic climate, which have obviously impacted the performance of the country’s stocks this year. The question we ask ourselves is whether or not the bad news has already been priced into the market. It is clear that some of the news has already been priced in, since Chinese shares have declined in value, both in absolute terms and in comparison to their worldwide counterparts. We at FTIS are intrigued by the fact that several mood indices appear to be at or near all-time lows in terms of optimism.

“Bull markets are born on pessimism, develop on skepticism, mature on optimism, and expire on exuberance,” as Sir John Templeton used to say about the stock market.

We are keeping a close eye on fiscal policymakers for any more softening measures that might prompt us to revise our posture and view in the future.

What Are the Risks?

All investments have risks, including the possibility of losing one’s initial investment. The value of assets can go down as well as up, and investors may not earn back the whole amount of money they put into the transaction. It is common for stock values to vary substantially, often very quickly, owing to factors influencing individual firms, certain industries or sectors, or the general state of the stock market. Investments in foreign securities are subject to additional risks, such as those associated with political and economic developments, trading practices, availability of information, limited markets, currency exchange rate fluctuations, and monetary policy.

A strategy that focuses on specific countries, regions, industries or sectors or specific types of investment from time to time may be more vulnerable to adverse developments in those areas of focus than a strategy that invests in a broader range of countries, regions, industries, sectors or types of investment.

China may be exposed to significant levels of economic, political, and social instability in the near future.

Any firms and/or case studies mentioned herein are strictly for the purpose of illustration; any investment mentioned herein may or may not be currently owned by any portfolio advised by Franklin Templeton at the time of publication.

There is also no indication of the trading intent of any Franklin Templeton managed portfolio contained in the information provided. Nothing in this estimate, prediction, or projection can be guaranteed to occur.

Important Legal Information

However, this material is meant to be of general interest only, and should not be regarded as individual investment advice, nor as a suggestion or solicitation to buy, sell, or hold any particular security, or to engage in any investment plan. It is not intended to be used as legal or tax advice. The content of this document may not be duplicated, distributed, or published without the express written consent of Franklin Templeton. Investment manager’s views are stated, and comments, opinions, and analyses are provided as of the publishing date, and they may be changed or updated at any time without prior notice.

• Neither the information supplied in this material nor the conclusions drawn from it are meant to be comprehensive analyses of every material fact pertaining to any nation, area, or market.
• If the value of your assets and your income from them decline as well as rise, you may not earn back the whole amount of money you first put into them.
• All investments have risks, including the possibility of losing one’s initial investment.
• In the creation of this document, data from third-party sources may have been used, and Franklin Templeton (“FT”) has not independently checked, validated, or audited any of the information included therein.

Neither the mention of any individual securities nor the interpretation of such mentions constitutes or should be taken to constitute a recommendation to purchase, hold or sell any securities, and the information provided regarding such individual securities (if any) is insufficient to serve as a basis for making an investment decision.

The products, services, and information described herein may not be available in all countries, and they may only be made available outside of the United States through other FT affiliates and/or their distributors to the extent that local laws and regulations permit.

The Franklin Templeton U.S.

Franklin Distributors, LLC, member FINRA/SIPC, is the principal distributor of Franklin Templeton U.S.

According to the July 31,2021, MSCI China Net TR USD Index in relation to the MSCI ACWI Net TR USD Index.

Fees, costs, and sales charges are not included in the price.

The index is derived from the Macrobond MCSI Total Return USD Index.

MSCI makes no representations or guarantees, and shall have no liability, with regard to any MSCI data that is reproduced in this document.

This report has not been developed or sponsored by MSCI in any manner.

Fees, costs, and sales charges are not included in the price.

3.Source: MSCI ACWI Total Net Return USD (Adjusted for inflation).

4.Source: Macrobond; MCSI China Net Total Return USD Index from February 2021 to August 17, 2021 (for the period February 2021 to August 17, 2021).

No further dissemination or use of this material is authorized.

Indexes are unmanaged, and as a result, they cannot be directly invested in.

In no way can past performance serve as an indicator or a guarantee of future outcomes.

“China’s short-term rate reaches near 6-year high on holiday demand, policy tightening concerns,” Reuters, January 26, 2021, page 1.

“Xi Jinping’s attack on technology will shift China’s trajectory,” according to The Economist.

8)Source: “Delta Variant: What We Know about the Science,” published by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on August 19, 2021.

Information courtesy of Agencia EFE.

As of August 16, 2021, the following sources were used: USA Facts, US Coronavirus vaccination tracker.

11.Sources: The New England Journal of Medicine, “Effectiveness of an Inactivated SARS-CoV-2 Vaccine in Chile,” published on July 7, 2021, in the New England Journal of Medicine.

The date is July 13, 2021. 12.Source: The Washington Post, “New limitations sweep China as authorities race to contain delta epidemic,” August 3, 2021, “New restrictions sweep China as officials race to contain delta outbreak.”